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CONTROLLING THE PROSECUTION OF BRIBERY:
APPLYING CORPORATE LAW PRINCIPLES TO DEFINE
A “FOREIGN OFFICIAL” IN THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
Kayla Feld
Abstract: This Comment focuses on the debate surrounding the definition of an
“instrumentality” within the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act’s (FCPA) “foreign official”
provision. The FCPA prohibits bribery of “foreign officials” but provides little guidance as to
the types of entities included within the meaning of an “instrumentality.” The Department of
Justice construes this term broadly and therefore can aggressively prosecute alleged
corruption. This Comment argues that courts should provide guidance on the definition of a
“foreign official” within the meaning of the FCPA by applying principles of control drawn
from corporate law. Such guidance would accomplish three important tasks. First, it would
help corporations comply with the FCPA. Second, it would align with the approach used by
foreign jurisdictions designated in treaty obligations. Finally, it could help achieve
Congress’s original objectives in enacting the legislation: namely, to prevent corruption of
foreign public officials as well as the negative consequences for foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, federal investigations
uncovered illicit practices in both government and private business,
including unreported campaign contributions and “questionable” and
“illegal”1 payments to domestic and foreign political officials.2 The
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) began investigating these
payments and discovered that approximately 400 U.S. corporations had
made over $300 million in bribes to foreign public officials in order to
secure business.3 In 1977, Congress responded by enacting the Foreign
1. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REPORT OF
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES A-1 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 353
(May 19, 1976) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES].
2. See id.; see also John Castellano, Current Issues in Cases Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5669 (May 25, 2011); Amy D. Westbrook, Enthusiastic
Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45
GA. L. REV. 489, 499 (2011).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–6 (1977); see also REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 1, at A–C; Thomas McSorley,
Article: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 750 (2011); Theodore C.
THE
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Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)4 to criminalize bribery and improve the
U.S. corporate image abroad.5 Congress noted the “severe foreign policy
problems” these bribes created for the U.S., and intended for the FCPA
to prevent U.S. businesses from engaging in bribery, as this would have
negative implications for the image of the United States abroad.6
Congress sought to restore public confidence in American corporate
practice.7 The primary evil that Congress sought to address with the
FCPA was improper payments to foreign government officials, which
“invariably tend[] to embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem
for the United States among citizens of foreign nations, and lend
credence to the suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United
States that American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the
political processes of their nations.”8
The FCPA had a slow start.9 During the first quarter century of the
FCPA’s existence, the SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ), jointly

Sorensen, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 719, 719
(1976).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3
(2006)).
5. See McSorley, supra note 3, at 750 (discussing the factors contributing to the creation of the
FCPA); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 499; Castellano, supra note 2.
6. See Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 5 (1977) (statement of Rep. Bob Eckhardt, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin.,
H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce) (stating that “[b]ribery of foreign officials by U.S.
corporations . . . creates severe foreign policy problems”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, 4–5 (1977); S.
REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (noting “severe adverse effects” of bribery); REPORT OF THE SEC ON
QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 61;
Declaration of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Counts
One Through Ten of the Indictment at 140, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS
(C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 21, 2011), ECF No. 305 [hereinafter Koehler Declaration]; see also U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY
PROVISIONS 2 (June 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/laypersons-guide.pdf [hereinafter FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS].
7. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 4–5 (1977) (statement of Rep. Bob Eckhardt, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. &
Fin., H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (noting that bribery
“erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market system”); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 124.
8. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 5.
9. See S. REP NO. 95-114, at 11–12 (explaining the enforcement duties of the DOJ and SEC);
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining the
respective roles of the DOJ and SEC); Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, Introductory Essay: A
Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy,
47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 159 (2010).
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responsible for enforcing the FCPA,10 initiated only two or three cases
per year.11 Fines tended to remain below $1,000,000.12 However, after
an initial twenty years of relative dormancy, enforcement surged.13 Over
the past ten years, the DOJ and SEC have greatly increased the number
of enforcement actions and the severity of fines assessed.14 In 2010, for
example, the DOJ and the SEC initiated a record of forty-eight and
twenty-six cases respectively.15 This trend shows no sign of abating, and
the DOJ recently confirmed its intent to “vigorously enforce” the
FCPA.16 In November 2009, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer
remarked that the “past year was probably the most dynamic single year
in the more than 30 years since the FCPA was enacted” and promised to
continue “the upward trend in FCPA enforcement.”17
While DOJ officials commend the surge in investigations and
prosecutions, the reaction in the corporate world has been less
enthusiastic. Of particular concern to directors and officers of
corporations doing business abroad is the rise of prosecution of
individuals.18 According to Mark Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the
10. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 2.
11. 4 ARKIN, BUSINESS CRIME § 18 (Matthew Bender 2011); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 497;
Roger M. Witten et al., The Increased Prosecution of Individuals Under the FCPA: Trends and
Implications, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REP.: RISK AND COMPLIANCE, no. 12, 2009, at 10.
12. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 495.
13. See 4 ARKIN, supra note 11, at § 18; Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 90 (2010); Mike Koehler, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV.
389, 389 (2010) (noting “FCPA enforcement was largely non-existent for most of its history”);
Dionne Searcey, U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124329477230952689.html; FCPA Digest of Cases and Review
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
SHEARMAN
&
STERLING
LLP,
i–xi
(Oct.
1,
2009),
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/fcpa_digest.pdf (listing FCPA enforcement actions
chronologically).
14. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 495–96, 522 (noting “recent years have seen an ‘extraordinary
upswing’ in the number of FCPA actions brought by the DOJ and SEC”).
15. See 4 ARKIN, supra note 11, at § 18; 2011 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER
LLP,
2
(Jan.
3,
2012),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.
16. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Opening Plenary of the VI Ministerial Global
Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity (Nov. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/131641.htm.
17. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speechestestimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf.
18. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 15, at 2–4 (discussing FCPA enforcement
actions against individual defendants in 2011).
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Fraud Division at the DOJ, the rise in individual prosecutions is “not an
accident.”19 Rather, the trend reflects the Department’s policy of
deterring bribery by holding individuals personally accountable.20 The
sanctions resulting from these enforcement actions have also risen
dramatically. In 1994, the largest FCPA-related sanction was $24.8
million.21 In 2008, a settlement for $800 million by Seimens
Aktiengesellschaft (“Seimens AG”) and its subsidiaries dwarfed the
previous record.22 The increase in prosecutions and sanctions reflects a
trend of increasingly aggressive DOJ enforcement policy.23 The FCPA’s
vague language has facilitated the Government’s increasingly vigorous
approach by permitting a broad interpretation of the statute’s
provisions.24
This Comment surveys the debate surrounding the clarity of the term
“instrumentality” within the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” and
recommends a resolution. The FCPA prohibits bribery of “foreign
officials,” defined as “any officer or employee of a foreign government
or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof,”25 but provides
little guidance as to the types of entities included within the meaning of
an “instrumentality.”26 The DOJ construes this term broadly, which
permits it to aggressively prosecute alleged corruption.27 Corporations
19. Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORP. CRIME REP.
36(1) (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/mendelsohn091608.htm.
20. See id.; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Bar Association
National Institute on White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/2010/02-25-10aagAmericanBarAssosiation.pdf (“[T]he prospect of significant prison sentences . . . should make clear
to every corporate executive . . . that we will seek to hold you personally accountable for FCPA
violations.”).
21. See United States v. Lockheed Corp., No. CR.A. 194CR226MHS, 1995 WL 17064259, at *7
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1995); Bixby, supra note 13, at 128.
22. See Plea Agreement at 10–11, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071
(S.D. Tex. filed Feb. 11, 2009), ECF No. 12; SEC v. Halliburton Co., No. 4:09-CV-399, at 5 (S.D.
Tex. 2009); see also Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 9, at 161; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery; Charges Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc.
with Related Accounting Violations – Companies to Pay Disgorgement of $177 Million; KBR
Subsidiary to Pay Criminal Fines of $402 Million; Total Payments to be $579 Million, Litigation
Release No. 20897A, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2935A (Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm.
23. See Bixby, supra note 13, at 90–91; 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP, 4 (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.aspx.
24. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 503.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
26. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Response of the United States to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 4,

14 - Feld Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

CONTROLLING THE PROSECUTION OF BRIBERY

3/13/2013 7:01 PM

249

have not been motivated to challenge the Government’s interpretation in
court, and have tended to opt for settlement rather than proceed to trial.28
In 2011 alone, six settlements, plea agreements, or deferred prosecutions
involved disputes over the definition of “instrumentality.”29 While
corporations may have preferred to resolve these cases without a
possibly lengthy trial and the ensuing publicity, each case diverted from
trial has deprived the courts of a chance to clarify crucial definitions.30
On the other hand, individuals prosecuted for bribery under the FCPA
typically proceed to trial in an attempt to avoid high fines coupled with
jail sentences.31 For this reason, the individuals who have litigated FCPA
cases have played a crucial role in developing the sparse jurisprudence.
The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions (“Working Group”), which monitors the implementation
and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, has also
commented on the lack of explicit language in the definition of a
“foreign official.”32 In its most recent evaluation, the Working Group
noted that some courts had addressed the definition, and it noted more
“positive legal developments.”33 The Working Group noted that District
Court opinions are not binding on higher courts and thus the
interpretation they provide remains subject to further dispute.34 Even the
United States v. O’Shea, No. H-09-629 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 50 (arguing that
Congress intended for the FCPA to have a broad interpretation because of the use of the word “any”
in the foreign official provision).
28. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 2, at 497; Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a
Foreign Official Anyway? 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1248 (2008); Stephen G. Huggard & Haley
Morrison, Some FCPA Concepts are Coming into Focus: Implications for the UK Bribery Act,
MARTINDALE-HUBBEL,
July
5,
2011,
available
at
http://www.edwardswildman.com/files/upload/comlitjune11_usfocusbriberyact.html.
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. See FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, 18 (Jan. 2012), http://www.shearman.com/files/
Publication/bb1a7bff-ad52-4cf9-88b99d99e001dd5f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6ec0766a-25aa-41ec-8731041a672267a6/FCPA-Digest-Trends-and-Patterns-Jan2012.pdf.
31. See Bixby, supra note 13, at 111–12.
32. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES: PHASE 3: REPORT ON
THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON
COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 26 (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf
[hereinafter 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3].
33. See id. at 27. Because of the timing of the report, the Working Group mentioned only United
States v. Nam Quoc Nguyen, 2:08-CR-522-TJS (E.D. Pa., Sept. 4, 2008), which did not produce a
written opinion.
34. 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3, supra note 32, at 27.
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more recent court opinions that provide written opinions35 (which were
not available at the time the Working Group prepared its report) provide
little clarity, as they merely confirm that “[s]tate-owned business
enterprises may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered
instrumentalities of a foreign government and their officers and
employees to be foreign officials.”36 This language does little to check
the DOJ’s broad interpretation of “foreign official,” permitting it to
continue its pattern of aggressive enforcement without providing useful
guidance to businesses.37 For this reason, the OECD’s Working Group
has urged more “positive legal developments concerning the application
of the definition of ‘foreign official’ in the FCPA to . . . employees of
state-owned or controlled enterprises.”38
Several individuals have already challenged the DOJ’s interpretation
of the “foreign official” definition.39 However, a troublesome lack of
clarity remains. In the meantime, many corporations, fearing sanctions
because of what they perceive as excessive vagueness in the law, have
been forced to adopt the hyper-conservative strategy of labeling any
company with a greater than one percent government ownership as “high
risk.”40 This tactic significantly limits the types of businesses U.S.
corporations may work with, reducing their ability to compete with
corporations from other countries that are not similarly restrained.41
This Comment argues that courts should either clarify the definition
of a “foreign official” or supply guidelines that will clarify standards for
prosecuting FCPA violations. International treaties and anti-corruption
laws in foreign countries could assist in formulating guidelines to clarify
the definition of a foreign official.42 If courts interpret the meaning of a
35. See, e.g., Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the
Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May
18, 2011).
36. UNITED STATES, U.S. RESPONSE TO OECD PHASE 1 QUESTIONNAIRE (Oct. 30, 1998),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response1.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
RESPONSE TO OECD PHASE 1 QUESTIONNAIRE] (emphasis added).
37. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1250.
38. 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3, supra note 32, at 27.
39. See Witten et al., supra note 11, at 10 (noting “unlike companies, individuals are more likely
not to settle and to go to trial”).
40. See, e.g., Ryan Morgan, ‘Majority’ Report, THE FCPA BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011, 7:18 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/3/15/majority-report.html.
41. See McSorley, supra note 3, at 750; Jacqueline C. Wolff & Nirav S. Shah, Is Anyone Not a
Foreign Official Under the FCPA?, 18 BUS. CRIMES BULL. (Law Journal Newsletters), Feb. 2011,
at 6, available at http://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/Articles_By_Us/
Foreign%20Bribery(3).pdf.
42. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business

14 - Feld Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

3/13/2013 7:01 PM

CONTROLLING THE PROSECUTION OF BRIBERY

251

“foreign official,” they could refine the definition using principles of
corporate law to evaluate a business entity’s connection to the
government by the level of control exerted on it by the government. In
doing so, courts would help corporations comply with the FCPA by
using legal principles familiar to them. Ideally, this path would result in
increased clarity and better compliance.
Part I of this Comment introduces the basic provisions of the FCPA,
including relevant amendments. Part II describes the legislative history
of the FCPA. Part III examines the case law dealing with the definition
of a “foreign official.” Part IV discusses approaches to defining
corporate responsibility from international anti-bribery legislation.
Finally, Part V argues that courts should apply principles of control
drawn from U.S. corporate law when defining a “foreign official” for
purposes of the FCPA. This approach should remain consistent with
those used by foreign jurisdictions to comply with treaty obligations.
I.

THE FCPA WAS DESIGNED TO INCREASE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PREVENT CORRUPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

The FCPA contains two types of provisions: (1) accounting and
internal control provisions; and (2) anti-bribery provisions.43 The former
require companies with securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges to
maintain records that “accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”44 These provisions also require
the companies to maintain a system of internal controls that provides
reasonable assurances that transactions are recorded and executed with
the general or specific authorization of the management.45 The following
sections describe the anti-bribery provisions in greater detail.
A.

The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA Outline Prohibited
Corrupt Acts

Any company with securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges is subject
to the FCPA.46 The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions provide in relevant
part:
Transactions, art. 1, Nov. 21, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43 (1998) [hereinafter OECD
Convention].
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
44. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
45. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
46. Id. § 78dd-1(a).
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(a) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities
registered [with the SEC], or for any officer, director, employee,
or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on
behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or
authorization of the giving of anything of value to—
(1) any foreign official for purposes of—
(A)
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in
his official capacity,
(ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act
in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or
(iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a
foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to,
any person.47
The FCPA applies to United States companies and their personnel,
foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and
United States citizens or any person while in the United States
territory.48 The FCPA prohibits anyone to whom it applies from paying,
offering, promising, or authorizing payment or anything of value to a
foreign official to obtain or retain business.49 The anti-bribery provisions
can be divided into three elements: (1) “anything of value” given for the
purposes of (2) “obtaining or retaining business” to a (3) “foreign
official.”50
The FCPA does not define the first element, “anything of value,” and
does not provide a de minimus exception.51 FCPA enforcement actions
have shown that a variety of things may fit the definition.52 For example,
47. Id. § 78dd-1(a); see also § 78c(a)(8) (defining an “issuer” as “any person who issues or
proposes to issue any security”).
48. Id. § 78dd-1(a); see also Koehler, supra note 13, at 389.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1).
50. See Koehler, supra note 13, at 389–90.
51. Id. at 390.
52. Id.
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one enforcement action penalized an American company for providing
Nigerian foreign officials with vehicles filled with cash and left in hotel
parking lots,53 while in another instance a company’s less tangible
payment of “executive training programs at U.S. universities” for
Chinese officials was considered among the items of value.54
The second element of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions is the use of
the item of value for obtaining or retaining business.55 A Fifth Circuit
decision interpreted this element broadly, holding that the legislative
history of the FCPA shows Congress intended to prohibit a range of
payments beyond simply acquiring or retaining contracts.56 In United
States v. Kay,57 the defendants, members of a Houston-based corporation
that exported grain, were accused of making payments to Haitian
government officials.58 The issue was whether these payments, allegedly
made for the purpose of reducing the corporation’s customs duties and
taxes, was sufficient to constitute an offense under the FCPA.59 The
court determined that such payments can provide an unfair advantage to
the payer, thus functioning to “obtain or retain business.”60 The court
emphasized that such payments do not automatically violate the FCPA,
only those “intended to produce an effect” that would “assist in
obtaining or retaining business.”61 The court held that Congress had
intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist
the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining
business.62 Since Kay, several other enforcement actions have involved
53. See Information at 17–18, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D.
Tex. filed Feb. 6, 2009), ECF No. 1.
54. Complaint at 16, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., Case No. CV 09-6094 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 31,
2009). UTStarcom, the subject of this enforcement action, had also provided foreign government
officials or their families with work visas to work at UTStarcom facilities without requesting they
actually work, paid for trips to popular destinations in the United States to visit company facilities,
despite the fact that no facilities existed in these areas, and spent approximately seven million
dollars worth of gifts in conjunction with the executive training courses. See Press Release, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges California Telecom Company with Bribery and Other FCPA
Violations, Litigation Release No. 21357, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3093
(Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21357.htm; Koehler,
supra note 13, at 390–91.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(B), 78dd-2(a)(1)(B), 78dd-3(a)(1)(B).
56. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Koehler, supra note 13, at 393.
57. 359 F.3d 738.
58. Id. at 740.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 754–55.
61. Id. at 756.
62. Id.
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allegedly improper payments that assisted the payor in doing business in
a foreign country.63 These include payments for customs duties, taxes,
licenses, permits, and certifications.64
The third element involves the person to whom the payment or gift is
given. The FCPA defines “foreign official” as:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public
international organization, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department,
agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public
international organization.65
The FCPA does not define “instrumentality.” Scholars have noted the
lack of a clear definition and the susceptibility of instrumentality to
multiple interpretations lead to significant confusion among corporations
and litigants in FCPA actions.66
The anti-bribery provisions were created with one limited exception.67
Commonly referred to as the “grease payments” exception,68 this
provision permits the use of “facilitating or expediting payment . . . to
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action
by a foreign official, political party, or party official.”69 Routine
governmental action is defined as “only an action which is ordinarily
and commonly performed by a foreign official [and] does not include
any decision . . . to award new business or continue business with a
63. Koehler, supra note 13, at 394 n.35; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Charges Eli Lilly and Company with FCPA Violations, Release 2012-273 (Dec. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-273.htm (involving allegations of improper
payments by subsidiaries to foreign government officials to win business in Russia, Brazil, China,
and Poland); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Johnson & Johnson with
Foreign
Bribery,
Release
2011-87
(Apr.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-87.htm (involving allegations of bribing public doctors
in several European countries and paying kickbacks to Iraq to obtain business).
64. Koehler, supra note 13, at 394.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
66. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1248.
67. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting “routine governmental
action” refers to “very narrow categories of largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities
performed by mid- or low-level foreign functionaries”); Timothy O’Toole & Andrew T. Wise, You
Mean You’re Really Going to Try an FCPA Case? A Checklist of Defenses for Practitioners
Handling Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Cases, THE CHAMPION, Sept. 2011, at n.6, available at
http://nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=21931&terms=a+checklist+of+fcpa+defenses
(noting
that
counsel advising companies on FCPA compliance advise against relying on this exception).
68. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 2, at 505–06 (explaining the types of action permitted by the
grease payments exception); McSorley, supra note 3, at 764.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).
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particular party.”70 Despite their somewhat unsavory-sounding name,
“grease payments,” because of their routine nature, are not viewed as
bribery and are therefore lawful under the FCPA.71
Congress has amended the FCPA twice.72 In 1988, Congress added
two affirmative defenses and refined the knowledge requirement73 for an
FCPA violation.74 The first defense to enforcement is that “the
payment . . . was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the
foreign official’s . . . country.”75 This defense is limited because no
country has a law expressly permitting bribery.76 The second defense is
for “promotional expenses,” and permits a payment to a foreign official
if it was a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and
lodging expenses” and was directly related to the “promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services.”77 The crucial
element of this defense is the reasonableness of the expenditure.78
70. See id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)−(B).
71. See id. § 78dd-1(b).
72. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); see
also Westbrook, supra note 2, at 502. For House and Senate Reports relevant to the FCPA’s 1988
and 1998 Amendments, see Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), Legislative History, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
73. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1121 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1901) (stating that
“knowledge is established by if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such
circumstance, unless the person actually believes the circumstance does not exist”); see also United
States v. Bourke, No.
09-4704-cr (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2011) (defendant liable where he consciously avoided knowing an
intermediary was paying bribes); United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374–78 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (holding “knowledge of the object of the conspiracy,” sufficient to satisfy the knowledge
requirement); United States v. Self, No. SA CR 08-110-AG (C.D. Cal. 2008) (defendant liable when
he was “aware of the high probability that the payments” were improper, but “deliberately avoided
learning the true facts”).
74. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); see also Koehler Declaration, supra note 6,
at 127–41.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1).
76. See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting the defendant’s
contention that under local law he was relieved of criminal liability because he voluntarily reported
the bribe); ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR
CRIME PRACTITIONERS 16 (2d ed. 2012).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
78. See O’Toole & Wise, supra note 67 (noting “[t]he more the trip looks like a routine business
trip . . . the more viable the defense becomes”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Lucent
Technologies Inc. Agrees to Pay $1 Million Fine to Resolve FCPA Allegations (Dec. 21, 2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/December/07_crm_1028.html (stating that
defendants were liable for taking Chinese government officials on sightseeing trips to Disneyland,
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Congress amended the FCPA again in 199879 to ensure that it
complied with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials
in
International
Business
Transactions
(“OECD
Convention”).80 The United States’ interest in the OECD Convention
arose from concerns that the passage of the FCPA had put U.S.
businesses at a competitive disadvantage with foreign companies
unconstrained by comparable anti-bribery laws.81 The purpose of the
OECD Convention was to “level the playing field for business
worldwide,”82 and it required signatories to create or modify anticorruption legislation to comply with its requirements.83 The 1998
modifications to the FCPA extended the statute’s jurisdiction to conduct
occurring outside the United States.84 It also broadened the scope of
liability by including in the definition of “foreign official” foreign
nationals working for U.S. companies and officers of any public
international organization.85 Aside from the 1988 and 1998
Amendments, the structure of the FCPA has remained unchanged.
II.

THE FCPA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REVEALS THAT
CONGRESS DISAGREED OVER THE BEST METHOD TO
PROHIBIT CORRUPTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS

The legislative history has been read to provide support for both the
DOJ and SEC’s broad construction of the term “instrumentality,” as well
as the considerably narrower interpretation proposed by the corporations
subject to FCPA enforcement actions. The DOJ and SEC have argued
Universal Studios, and various cities).
79. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat.
1107, 1416–17 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff).
80. See OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 1; Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 26,
390–436 (discussing the portions of the FCPA’s legislative history relevant to the adoption of the
1998 amendments).
81. See Wolff & Shah, supra note 41, at 6; McSorley, supra note 3, at 750.
82. H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 12.
83. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at 7.
84. See, e.g., Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of
the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, United States v.
Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 21, 2011), ECF No. 304 [hereinafter
Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss].
85. See The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1416–17 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff).
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that Congress intended “instrumentalities” as a catchall term for entities
not covered by “agencies” or “departments.”86 Not surprisingly,
corporations subject to FCPA enforcement actions argue for a much
more narrow construction.87
This section summarizes the FCPA’s legislative history by
introducing the various congressional hearings, resolutions, and
proposed bills that ultimately led to its enactment.88 Congress became
concerned about the results of investigations made by the Watergate
Special Prosecutions Office of “illegal, and therefore undisclosed,
corporate campaign contributions in the 1972 elections.”89 These
contributions, as well as several instances involving “questionable” and
“illegal”90 payments made by United States companies to foreign
government officials or political parties,91 prompted the United States
Senate and House of Representatives to hold a series of hearings
concerning instances of corrupt payments.92
Between May 16, 1975, and September 12, 1975, the Senate
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations met on several different
occasions to discuss prominent instances of corruption.93 During the first
of these hearings, Senator Frank Church, the Chairman of the
Subcommittee, explained that the hearings were concerned with the
foreign policy consequences of illegal political payments made by
United States companies.94 A series of hearings held in the House and
Senate in 1975 led to proposals for legislation to deter corporations from
making corrupt payments.95
In May 1976, the SEC published a report on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments which gave new momentum to the discussion on

86. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1250, 1273.
87. See id.
88. For a significantly more extensive explanation of the legislative history, see Koehler
Declaration, supra note 6, at 10–143.
89. See REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 2–3.
90. See id. at 1.
91. See id. at 5.
92. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 at 6–7 (indicating the various bills considered over the course
of several hearings).
93. See George H. Mazzarantani, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 855,
855–56 (1988); Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
930, 930–31 n.1 (2012).
94. See Koehler, supra note 93, at 933.
95. See id.
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specifically criminalizing illegal payments.96 The report discussed
foreign and domestic payments with a focus on whether these payments
should have been disclosed to investors.97 Following the publication of
the report, there was a hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs titled “Corrupt Payments By U.S. Business
Enterprises” to discuss Senate Bills 3133, 3379, and 3418.98 President
Ford supported these efforts by establishing a Task Force on
Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad,99 issuing remarks introducing
new initiatives of the task force, and urging enactment of proposed
legislation to require the disclosure of payments to foreign officials.100
Despite several additional bills circulating through the House and
Senate, nothing was enacted. The final hearings of President Ford’s
term, held in September of 1976, discussed four bills. However, due to
“end of session pressures,” no bill passed before Congress adjourned in
October 1976.101
Once Congress reconvened, several bills began circulating that
eventually led to the FCPA. On January 18, 1977, Senator Proxmire
introduced Senate Bill 305.102 This bill prohibited bribery of any official
of a “foreign government or instrumentality thereof.”103 It did not define
either of these terms. Senate Bill 305 was ultimately merged with
another bill, House Bill 3815,104 to become the FCPA. House Bill 3815
defined a foreign official as “any officer or employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality.”105 The report
accompanying House Bill 3815 explains that the prohibited transactions
are those that are “corruptly intended to induce the recipient to use his
or her influence to affect any act or decision of a foreign official, foreign
government or an instrumentality of the foreign government . . . [the
96. REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES, supra note 1.
97. Id. at 55.
98. S. REP. NO. 94-1031, at 1 (1976).
99. See H.R. DOC. NO. 94-572, at 1 (1976) (Foreign Payments Disclosure: Message from the
President of the United States Urging Enactment of Proposed Legislation to Require the Disclosure
of Payments to Foreign Officials).
100. H.R. DOC. NO. 94-572.
101. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 7.
102. S. 305, 95th Cong. (1977).
103. Id. at 161.
104. H.R. 3815, 95th Cong. (1977).
105. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
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payment] must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official
position.”106 In early December of 1977, the Speaker of the House and
the Secretary of the Senate signed the amended Senate Bill 305.107
President Carter signed Senate Bill 305 on December 19, 1977.108 Senate
Bill 305 did not define an “instrumentality.”
III. COURTS HAVE CONSIDERED THE “FOREIGN OFFICIAL”
PROVISION, BUT CASE LAW REMAINS IN ITS INFANCY
Courts have had few opportunities to address the ambiguities in the
FCPA, and the DOJ’s broad interpretation of “foreign official” has
largely avoided judicial scrutiny for over a quarter century.109 This has
resulted from the tendency of companies prosecuted for violating the
FCPA to resort to extrajudicial settlements, such as non-prosecution and
plea agreements, rather than contesting the charges.110 To this point, the
only judicial responses have been scattered district court opinions
denying defendants’ motions to dismiss.111 In each of these actions, the
defendants have made essentially the same claim: the FCPA does not
apply to the conduct charged because, as a matter of law, the officers
and employees of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) are not “foreign
officials” as the term “instrumentality” does not encompass SOEs.112
The courts’ responses have been generally unvaried, stating that the
determination of whether “instrumentality” encompasses an entity
requires a fact-intensive analysis that is inappropriate for a motion to
dismiss.113 The initial court decisions provided no discussion of the
merits.114 More recent orders, however, have produced frameworks for
analyzing whether an entity could be considered an instrumentality

106. Id. at 7–8.
107. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to dd-2 (2006)).
108. Id.
109. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1245–46.
110. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Order Denying
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment, United States v. Carson,
No. 09-cr-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011).
112. See, e.g., Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 27.
113. See, e.g., In Chambers Criminal Minutes at 9, United States v. Lindsey, No. CR10-01031AHM (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011) (denying defendant Lindsey’s motion to dismiss); Order Denying
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 5, Carson, 2011 WL
5101701.
114. See Order at 1, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2009).
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within the meaning of the FCPA’s “foreign official.”115 Even with this
progression towards clarity, these district court opinions generate no
binding precedent.
A.

Although Early FCPA Decisions Indicated Who Could Be a
“Foreign Official,” the Courts Failed to Create a Workable
Framework

An SOE is a legal entity created by the government to partake in
commercial activities on the government’s behalf.116 An SOE may be
either partially- or fully-owned by the state.117 A significant proportion
of FCPA defendants are prosecuted for conduct involving SOEs,
therefore resolving the question will impact many FCPA defendants.118
The first cases119 to address whether an SOE could be an
“instrumentality” within the FCPA’s definition of a “foreign official”
did little to resolve the ambiguities.120 In United States v. Nguyen,121 the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the payments
made to SOEs in Vietnam did not violate the FCPA, because these types
of entities did not qualify as “instrumentalities” of the government.122
The court rejected their motion in a one-sentence order.123 In a
115. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment,
Carson, 2011 WL 5101701; see also United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
116. See, e.g., Definition of “State-Owned Enterprise (SOE),” INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/soe.asp#axzz22sSPLRwH (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
117. Id. For example, most businesses listed on the Chinese Stock Exchange are SOEs and have
strong links to the government. See Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Its
Application to U.S. Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13 (2008); STOYAN TENEV
ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE
INSTITUTIONS
OF
MODERN
MARKETS
83–84
(2002),
available
at
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/93111800485831c58971e9fc046daa89/Corporate+Governan
ce+in+China.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
118. See Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at 411–13 (discussing that over two-thirds of the
FCPA prosecutions in 2009 related to SOEs).
119. See Michael Volkov, Failing to Clarify: The Courts Try to Define “Foreign Official” in
FCPA Cases, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (May 23, 2011, 1:01 AM),
http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/05/23/failing-to-clarify-the-courts-try-to-define-foreign-officialin-fcpa-cases/.
120. See, e.g., Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 10; United States v.
Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2009); United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CRMARTINEZ-BROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010).
121. No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2009).
122. Gov’t’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss, for a Bill of Particulars,
and to Amend Schedule of Pretrial Submissions at 6, Nguyen (No. 08-522), ECF No. 109.
123. Order at 1, Nguyen (No. 08-522).
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subsequent case, United States v. Esquenazi,124 the defendant’s motion
to dismiss garnered only a slightly more substantial analysis from the
court.125 Esquenazi concerned a bribery scheme involving directors in
Telecommunications D’Haiti (Haiti Téléco), Haiti’s ninety-seven
percent state-owned telecommunications company.126 Rejecting the
defendant’s “foreign official” challenge, the court stated, “The plain
language of [the FCPA] and the plain meaning of [instrumentality] show
that as the facts are alleged in the indictment Haiti Teleco could be an
instrumentality of the Haitian government.”127 The court provided jury
instructions with a list of non-exclusive factors to assess whether Haiti
Téléco was an instrumentality of the Haitian government.128
B.

Recent Cases on the “Foreign Official” Definition Have Provided
a More Substantive Framework

The California District Court in United States v. Aguilar129 addressed
more substantively whether an SOE might qualify as an instrumentality
within the meaning of the FCPA.130 In this case, the government charged
the Lindsey Manufacturing Company, along with its president and chief
financial officer, with paying bribes to two high-ranking employees of
Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), an electric utility company
owned by the Mexican government.131 The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that an SOE can never be an “instrumentality” of a
foreign government because this would be contrary to the language and
legislative intent of the statute.132 The ordinary meaning of the term

124. No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010).
125. Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss
Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 1, Esquenazi (No. 0921010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN).
126. Indictment at 6, Esquenazi (No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN); see also Stunning
Haiti Teleco Development, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
stunning-haiti-teleco-development (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
127. See Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to
Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 3, Esquenazi (No.
09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN).
128. See Volkov, supra note 119.
129. 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011), dismissed on other grounds, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180
(C.D. Cal. 2011).
130. Id. at 4–16.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the First Superseding Indictment;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3, Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (No. CR10-01031AHM) [hereinafter Aguilar Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss].
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“instrumentality” and the other provisions of the FCPA, according to
defendants, clearly does not encompass state-owned business
enterprises.133 Moreover, defendants argued, the legislative intent of the
FCPA was to prevent the harmful consequences of bribes to government
officials.134 Congress’s purpose was not to micro-manage U.S. business
with every foreign company in which a government may have a
monetary interest.135 The statute, therefore, singles out officials in
government positions and does not encompass non-governmental
employees of even majority state-owned companies.136
The argument failed in April 2011, when Judge Matz denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss,137 noting that the FCPA’s statutory
language is clear.138 The court held that “a state-owned corporation
having the attributes of CFE may be an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign
government within the meaning of the FCPA, and officers of such a
state-owned corporation, as [the individuals who allegedly received
bribes], may therefore be ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of the
FCPA.”139 Judge Matz articulated a non-exclusive list of characteristics
shared by government agencies and departments that qualify as
“instrumentalities”:
 The entity provides a service to the citizens . . . of the
jurisdiction.
 The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are
appointed by, government officials.
 The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through
governmental appropriations or through revenues
obtained as a result of government-mandated taxes,
licenses, fees or royalties . . . .
 The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or
controlling power to administer its designated functions.
 The entity is widely perceived and understood to be
performing official (i.e., governmental) functions.140

133. See id. at 12.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 18–19.
136. See id. at 12.
137. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
138. Id. at 1113.
139. Id. at 1110.
140. Id. at 1115.
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Judge Matz reasoned that an “instrumentality” need not share “all of
its characteristics with both a department and an agency,” lest the term
be “robbed of independent meaning.”141 He then applied the listed
factors to CFE, and noted that CFE performs a function that the Mexican
Constitution acknowledges is solely a government function,142 “was
created by statute as a ‘decentralized public entity,’” and has a
“governing Board . . . comprised of various high-ranking governmental
officials.”143 Judge Matz also found very convincing the fact that it
describes itself on its website as a governmental agency.144
A subsequent case involving CFE adopted Judge Matz’s analysis in
Aguilar. In United States v. O’Shea,145 the government charged a former
general manager at a large robotics corporation, John Joseph O’Shea,
with an 18-count indictment alleging he paid bribes to CFE in exchange
for contracts for his company.146 O’Shea moved to dismiss using
essentially the same argument as in Aguilar, that an SOE can never be an
instrumentality of the state.147 Judge Lynn Hughes, in the Southern
District of Texas, denied the motion.148 Judge Hughes did not issue a
written ruling but took judicial notice of several facts about CFE: under
Mexican law, electricity is a public service; CFE has a monopoly over it;
the Mexican Ministry of Energy, Mines, and State-Owned Industry sets
requirements for CFE; and the President of Mexico appoints the general
director of CFE.149 The factors Judge Hughes noted generally matched
the rubric laid out by Judge Matz, which indicates some consistency in
the analytical framework courts have used to characterize a “foreign
official.”150
In another case involving a challenge to the “foreign official”

141. Id. at 1114.
142. Id. at 1115–16; see also Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as
amended, Art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federactión [DO], 5 de Enero de,1917 (Mex.).
143. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (emphasis in original).
144. Id.
145. No. H-09-629 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012).
146. Indictment at 7–8, O’Shea (No. H-09-629).
147. Defendant O’Shea’s Opposed Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Seventeen of the
Indictment at 2, O’Shea (No. 09-629).
148. Management Order at 1, O’Shea, (No. 09-629), ECF No. 107.
149. See William McGrath, Judge Denies Motion to Dismiss Based on Definition of Foreign
Official in O’Shea FCPA Case, FED. LAW SEC. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.fedseclaw.com/
2012/01/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1/judge-denies-motion-to-dismiss-based-ondefinition-of-foreign-official-in-oshea-fcpa-case/#axzz2KW9Wj2Ka.
150. Compare id., with United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal 2011).
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provision, United States v. Carson,151 Judge James Selna of the Central
District of California, like Judges Matz and Hughes, emphasized the
importance of the factual inquiry: “the question of whether state-owned
companies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA is a question of
fact.”152 In this case, Stuart Carson, the Former Chief Executive Officer
of Control Components, Inc. (CCI), was indicted along with five other
defendants.153 The defendants moved to dismiss the first ten counts of
the indictment with the familiar argument that an SOE cannot be an
“instrumentality” as a matter of law.154 The court denied the motion to
dismiss, stating that adopting the defendants’ construction would lead to
an “impermissible narrowing of a statute intended to mount a broad
attack on government corruption.”155
Judge Selna employed a different framework from those used in
Aguilar and O’Shea.156 The non-exclusive list of characteristics of
government agencies that meet the description of an instrumentality
include:
 The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its
employees;
 The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity;
 The purpose of the entity’s activities;
 The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign
state’s law, including whether the entity exercises
exclusive or controlling power to administer its
designated functions;
 The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and
 The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity,
including the level of financial support by the state (e.g.,

151. No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011).
152. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 3,
Carson, 2011 WL 5101701.
153. Indictment at 2–11, Carson (No. SACR 09–00077–JVS).
154. Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 11.
155. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 5,
Carson, 2011 WL 501701. (The trial was scheduled for June 5, 2012, but before it occurred the
defendants reached plea agreements.) For selected documents from the Carson docket, see FCPA
and Related Enforcement Actions, United States v. Stuart Carson, et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/carsons.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
156. Compare Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the
Indictment at 5, Carson, 2011 WL 501701, with United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108,
1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).157
The court emphasized that no single factor is dispositive.158 The list
purports mainly to indicate what types of evidence are relevant when
determining whether state-owned companies constitute an
“instrumentality” under the FCPA.159
These cases reveal an evolution in court guidance on the issue of what
kind of entity may be classified as an “instrumentality” of government.
All the cases emphasize that the analysis will depend on questions of
fact, not law.160 Defendants, restricted to legal arguments by the format
of a motion to dismiss, consistently advanced the same theory: that,
under the FCPA, an SOE can never be an “instrumentality” as a matter
of law.161 Yet each judge, in addressing the definition of an
instrumentality, specifically rejected the defendants’ contention.162 None
of the decisions suggested what level of state ownership would make an
SOE an “instrumentality” under the FCPA. Businesses attempting to
develop compliance programs may become frustrated by the fact that
courts have declined to produce a bright-line rule regarding what makes
an entity an “instrumentality.”163
C.

The Department of Justice Defines “Instrumentality” Broadly and
States That It Can Include State-Owned or State-Controlled
Entities
The Department asserts that it provides sufficient guidance with

157. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 3–
4, Carson, 2011 WL 501701.
158. Id. at 5. The court also rejected the defendants’ void-for-vagueness challenge, stating that
the Government’s “substantial evidentiary burden to establish that a business entity constitutes a
government instrumentality . . . does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at
11. The court rejected the defendants’ argument for applying the rule of lenity. Id. at 10.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 6; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
161. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment
at 6, Carson, 2011 WL 501701; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Order Denying Defendant Joel
Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal
Offense and for Vagueness at 3, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZBROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010); Order at 1, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
2, 2009).
162. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment
at 6, Carson, 2011 WL 501701; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Order Denying Defendant Joel
Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal
Offense and for Vagueness at 3, Esquenazi (No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN); Order at 1,
Nguyen (No. 08-522).
163. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 574; Cohen, supra note 28, at 1272.

14 - Feld Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/13/2013 7:01 PM

266

[Vol. 88:245

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

respect to FCPA enforcement to notify companies how to comply.164 At
a recent Senate hearing, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Greg
Andres confirmed the DOJ’s position that the Department provides
sufficient guidance with respect to FCPA enforcement.165 Mr. Andres
listed several sources of information, including the DOJ’s Lay Person’s
Guide to the FCPA166 and the FCPA Opinion Procedure.167 The Lay
Person’s Guide to the FCPA conspicuously fails to define
“instrumentality.”168 In November 2012, the DOJ and the SEC published
a guidance document on the FCPA, in which they specifically addressed
the definition of an “instrumentality.”169 The report asserts that whether
a particular entity constitutes an “instrumentality” requires a “factspecific analysis of an entity’s ownership, control, status, and
function.”170 Furthermore, the report explains that in some circumstances
an entity may qualify as an instrumentality absent fifty percent or greater
foreign government ownership.171 Finally, the report refers to the list of
factors to consider that several courts had provided.172
164. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement
of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); CRIMINAL DIV. OF U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
U.S.
FOREIGN
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
20
(2012),
available
at
THE
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/29520121114101438198031.pdf.
165. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement
of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7, 62 (2011)
(statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.).
166. See FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3.
167. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement
of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 2(f) (2006). This
procedure allows companies to request determination by the Attorney General as to whether its
proposed conduct would violate FCPA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 2(f).
168. See Huggard & Morrison, supra note 28, at 1.
169. See A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, supra note 6, at
20.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 21.
172. Id. at 20 (The factors listed are: “the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity; the
foreign state’s degree of control over the entity (including whether key officers and directors of the
entity are, or are appointed by, government officials); the foreign state’s characterization of the
entity and its employees; the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; the purpose of the
entity’s activities; the entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s law; the exclusive
or controlling power vested in the entity to administer its designated functions; the level of financial
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In Carson, the DOJ supported its position with principles of statutory
construction, arguing that the statute is unambiguous because
“instrumentality” is a commonly used legal term173 and has an accepted
legal definition that would incorporate an instrumentality.174 This
position has succeeded in several cases, with courts agreeing that the
term is clear.175 The DOJ also argued in Carson that interpreting the
statute in context is necessary to ensure that all the provisions of the
statute have meaning.176 According to a principle of statutory
interpretation, courts should not interpret a statute in such a way that
portions of the statute have no effect.177 For example, the DOJ argues
that the provision defining “routine governmental action” as “providing
phone service, power and water supply” would be rendered meaningless
if the definition of “instrumentality” necessarily excluded SOEs.178
SOEs typically are included in the governmental entities that provide
these services.179
In Carson, the defendant contended that the DOJ opinions have no
binding application to parties other than those requesting the opinion and
“will not affect the requesting issuer’s . . . obligations to any other
agency,” such as the SEC.180 Furthermore, of the five opinions that have
dealt with the definition of “foreign official,” only one analyzes the facts

support by the foreign state (including subsidies, special tax treatment, government-mandated fees,
and loans); the entity’s provision of services to the jurisdiction’s residents; whether the
governmental end or purpose sought to be achieved is expressed in the policies of the foreign
government; and the general perception that the entity is performing official or governmental
functions.”)
173. The United States Code, for example, uses the word “instrumentality” in 1478 separate
provisions.
174. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts One through
Ten of the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 16, United States v. Carson, No.
SACR 09–00077–JVS (C.D. Cal. filed April 18, 2011), ECF No. 332 [hereinafter Gov’t’s
Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss] (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009) (defining instrumentality as “[a] thing used to achieve an end or purpose”)).
175. See, e.g., Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to
Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 3, United States v.
Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010); Transcript of
Pretrial Motions Hearing at 108, United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(“I think that the language itself, and the very definition of instrumentality that you proposed in your
briefs, makes it unnecessary to even engage in a legislative history or statutory analysis . . . .”)
176. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 20.
177. See id. (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1978) (“explaining that ‘[in]
construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used’”)).
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(iv) (2006).
179. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 21–22.
180. 28 C.F.R. § 80.11.
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provided by the company requesting the opinion.181 One scholar has
argued that DOJ opinions are therefore not functionally equivalent to the
binding precedent produced by judicial review.182 The defendant in
Carson also argued that, following the principle noscitur a sociis (a
word draws meaning from the terms around it), “instrumentality” should
be considered in context of the two terms preceding it in the statute,
“department” and “agency.”183 Following this principle, then an
“instrumentality” cannot be an entity in which the government has
merely a monetary investment, because such a construction would give
the word a different meaning than the others that precede it.184
The FCPA’s definition of “routine governmental action” in the grease
payments exception further supports defendants’ position.185 The FCPA
defines “routine governmental action” to include power and water
supply.186 The exception applies only to governmental action, which
could suggest that SOEs are not included in “instrumentalities” because
they are not exclusively government-owned.187 This last argument is
weakened by the fact that some of these functions are typically carried
out by commercial (e.g. not necessarily governmental) entities, lending
support to the conclusion that an instrumentality does not have to be
purely governmental.188

181. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 12-01
(Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2012/1201.pdf;
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 10-03 (Sept. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1003.pdf; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 94-01 (May 13, 1994), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1994/9401.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 86-01 (Jul. 18, 1986), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1986/r8601.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 82-02 (Feb. 18, 1982, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1982/r8202.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 80-01 (Oct. 29, 1980), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1980/r8001.pdf.
182. Cohen, supra note 28, at 1251.
183. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 12.
184. Id. (“[T]he government’s proposed reading of ‘instrumentality’ as encompassing any entity
in which a government has a monetary investment makes that term fundamentally different from the
first three since a business enterprise . . . cannot fairly be said to be carrying out governmental
(rather than commercial) functions . . . .”).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2006); see also supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)(iv).
187. Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 18.
188. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 22
(arguing that the “routine governmental action” exception demonstrates that there are functions, like
delivery of power, that can be both governmental and commercial).
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Anti-corruption legislation in foreign jurisdictions, while also not
binding, sheds some light on how corporate concepts of control have
been used to identify an SOE to which bribery statutes apply.
IV. THE OECD CONVENTION AND THE UK ANTI-BRIBERY
ACT TAKE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEFINING A
FOREIGN OFFICIAL THAN DOES THE FCPA
The heightened international focus on combating corruption has
caused various countries to introduce several anti-corruption statutes.189
This section examines two prominent examples of international anticorruption legislation: the OECD Convention190 and the UK Bribery Act
of 2010.191 The former can be used as a tool for interpreting the FCPA
because it binds the United States to conform its anti-bribery legislation
to the requirements outlined in the OECD Convention.192 The United
States advocated for the creation of the OECD Convention to “level the
playing field” for United States businesses that faced a comparative
disadvantage competing against businesses not subject to anti-bribery
legislation.193 Congress amended the FCPA in 1998 to implement and
ensure conformance with the OECD Convention.194 Each of the thirtynine signatories195 to the OECD Convention has an anti-corruption
framework because of the OECD’s requirement that countries create or
amend existing anti-corruption laws in order to comply with the OECD
Convention.196
189. See, e.g., Lucinda A. Low & Owen J. Bonheimer, Enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Extraterritorial Reach and the Effects of International Standards 12 (presented to the
Int’l Bar Ass’n Annual Conference Anti-Corruption Working Grp. in Chi., Ill. on Sept. 19, 2006).
190. OECD Convention, supra note 42.
191. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
192. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. I (“Each Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer,
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries,
to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.”).
193. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998).
194. See OECD Convention, supra note 42; S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998).
195. See OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 2012
(Nov.
2012),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
antibriberyconventionratification.pdf.
196. See, e.g., OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 4.4 (directing each signatory country to
“take remedial steps”). Additionally, many countries that have not ratified the OECD Convention
have either signed other treaties or introduced their own anti-corruption legislation. See Low &
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The UK Bribery Act is included as a comparison to the FCPA. The
UK Bribery Act is more expansive than both the FCPA and the OECD
Convention, protecting all forms of bribery (governmental and
commercial).197 Although the UK Bribery Act does not influence the
FCPA,198 it demonstrates how another country has approached
preventing bribery of various entities.
A.

The OECD Convention Defines “Foreign Official” by Focusing on
Function and Conduct

First, the OECD Convention uses familiar legal principles of
“control” to define a public enterprise.199 Second, it only prohibits
payments to entities that are majority owned by the government.200
Initially, thirty-three countries signed the OECD Convention on
December 17, 1998.201 The United States urged the development of the
Bonheimer , supra note 189, at 13–21 (discussing international anti-corruption conventions);
Snapshot of the China Country Profile, BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL (Dec. 2012),
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/china/snapshot/
(discussing the anti-corruption legislation China has enacted).
197. See U.S. FCPA vs. UK Bribery Act, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (last visited Feb. 14 2013),
http://www.transparency-usa.org/documents/FCPAvsBriberyAct.pdf (providing a chart comparing
the FCPA with the UK Anti-Bribery Act); see also Ron Reid, A Comparison Between the UK
Bribery Act and the FCPA, SHOOSMITHS (May 9, 2012), http://www.shoosmiths.co.uk/clientresources/legal-updates/A-comparison-between-UK-Bribery-Act-and-the-FCPA-1543.aspx (“The
UK Bribery Act is wider in scope than the US Foreign & Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in a number
of respects.”); FCPA and UK Bribery Act 2010 Offenses Comparison Chart, CHADBOURNE PARKE
LLP
(June
2011),
http://www.ukbriberyact2010.com/Assets/Resources/FCPA_BriberyActComparison_WEB.pdf.; A
Client Alert From Paul Hastings by Michelle Duncan et al., A Comparison of the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and the UK Bribery Act (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1750.pdf.
198. The UK Bribery Act is a law enacted only in the UK. No convention requires that the U.S.
reproduce the Bribery Act. The only connection between the FCPA and the UK Bribery Act is the
fact that both were enacted because the two countries are signatories to the OECD and thus obliged
to enact anti-bribery legislation in conformation with the OECD Convention. See OECD
Convention, supra note 42, at art. 4.4 (directing each signatory country to enact anti-bribery
legislation). The U.S. already conforms to the OECD, and thus it is not required to go beyond what
the OECD requires. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (amending the FCPA to conform to the OECD
Convention).
199. ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR
CRIME PRACTITIONERS 57 (2d ed. 2012).
200. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Negotiating Conference,
Commentaries on the Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions 14 (adopted Nov. 21, 1997), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/38028044.pdf.
201. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. I; see also supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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OECD Convention in the hope that the Convention would reduce the
competitive disadvantage U.S. businesses faced compared to their
foreign counterparts not subject to anti-bribery laws.202
The definition of a “foreign public official” in the OECD Convention
focuses on the individual’s function and conduct.203 The OECD
Convention defines a “foreign public official” as “any person holding a
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country . . . any
person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a
public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public
international organisation [sic].”204 The term most closely analogous to
the FCPA’s instrumentality is a “public enterprise.”205 The OECD
Convention defines a “public enterprise” as:
[A]ny enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a
government, or governments, may, directly or indirectly,
exercise a dominant influence. This is deemed to be the case,
inter alia, when the government or governments hold the
majority of the enterprise’s subscribed capital, control the
majority of votes attaching to shares issued by the enterprise or
can appoint a majority of the members of the enterprise’s
administrative or managerial body or supervisory board.206
An official of a “public enterprise” is deemed to perform a public
function unless “the enterprise operates on a normal commercial basis in
the relevant market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially equivalent to
that of a private enterprise.”207 An SOE, therefore, is either a public or a
private enterprise under the OECD’s definition, depending on its
function.208 A public-enterprise SOE might be largely owned or
substantially subsidized by the government. By contrast, a privateenterprise SOE benefits from some government investment, but
competes on an equal footing in the marketplace with other private
companies not subsidized by the government. Unlike the FCPA, the
OECD Convention explicitly includes SOEs in its “foreign public
official” provision.209 Crucially, the definition also focuses on the level
202. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998).
203. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1260.
204. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 1 ¶ 4(a); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
205. 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3, supra note 32, at 32.
206. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Negotiating Conference, supra
note 200, at 15.
207. Id.
208. See TARUN, supra note 199, at 57.
209. See id.
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of control the government holds over an enterprise to determine whether
it is a “public enterprise.”210
The fact that Congress did not include this term has sparked debate:
did Congress believe “public enterprises” were already encompassed by
“instrumentalities,” or did Congress not intend to prohibit bribes made to
SOEs?211 The legislative history of the 1998 Amendments supports both
propositions.212 Anna Harkin, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the
DOJ, sent the Speaker of the House (Newt Gingrich) and the President
of the Senate (Al Gore) a draft bill with the proposed amendments to the
FCPA on May 4, 1998.213 These “Transmittal Letters” explained that the
proposed legislation, among other things, purported to expand “the
FCPA definition of public official to include officials of [public
international] organizations.”214 On July 30, 1998, Senator Alfonse
D’Amato introduced these suggestions in S. 2375, an Act titled “The
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.”215 S.
2375 passed the Senate on July 31, 1998.216 In the House, the bill was
introduced as H.R. 4353 on July 30, 1998, and was passed October 9,
1998.217 President Clinton ultimately signed S. 2375 on November 10,
1998.218 Neither the House nor the Senate bills expressly incorporated
“public enterprises” into the definition of “foreign official.”219
In Carson, defendants support their argument that the post-1998
FCPA does not cover SOEs by pointing to the fact that Congress
borrowed some components of the OECD to augment the FCPA but did
not make a wholesale revision.220 Professor Koehler, who compiled the
portions of the legislative history relevant to the “foreign official”

210. Id.
211. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 29–31;
Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 29.
212. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1255–56.
213. See Transmittal Letters, Letter from Anne Harkin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Dep’t
of Justice, to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House (May 4, 1998) (on file with author).
214. See id.
215. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, S. 2375, 105th Cong.
(1998) (as passed on July 31, 1998).
216. Id.
217. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, H.R. 4353, 105th Cong.
(1998) (as passed on Oct. 9, 1998).
218. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1).
219. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 29.
220. See id. at 27–29.
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definition,221 explains that members of Congress were informed that the
1998 Amendments would not make the FCPA and the OECD
Convention identical.222 If this is the case, Defendants contend that the
portions of the OECD Convention that differ from the FCPA were only
adopted if Congress explicitly added them.223 Conversely, the
government in Carson has claimed that Congress’s decision to not adopt
provisions of the OECD Convention that differed slightly from the
FCPA may show that Congress believed these provisions were already
included.224 Unlike the legislative history of the 1998 Amendments and
the language of the FCPA itself, the OECD Convention’s definition of
“public official” contains some concrete ways to measure government
control.225
B.

The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act Provides a More Robust Prohibition on
Foreign Bribery than the OECD Convention

The United Kingdom Anti-Bribery Act of 2010226 (U.K. Bribery Act)
has been referred to as “the FCPA on steroids”227 because it has a broad
jurisdictional reach, prohibits bribes made to both private and public
individuals, and identifies “failure to prevent bribery”228 as a distinct
offense.229 The U.K. Bribery Act creates four separate offenses: 1)
bribing,230 2) being bribed,231 3) bribing a foreign public official,232 and

221. Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at ¶ 395.
222. Id.
223. Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 28–29.
224. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 29–
30. (“[O]nly one unrelated amendment to the FCPA was necessary in Congress’s view to bring the
statute into compliance with the OECD Convention. Otherwise, Congress considered the FCPA’s
definition of ‘foreign official’ to be inclusive of the definition in the OECD Convention.”).
225. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 1 ¶ 4(a).
226. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
227. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Introducing the New “FCPA on Steroids,” WALL ST. J. L. BLOG
(Dec. 28, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/12/28/introducing-the-new-fcpa-onsteroids/.
228. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.); see also LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, LITIGATION
DEPARTMENT, UK BRIBERY ACT 2010—AN EXTENDED TIMETABLE FOR GUIDANCE AND
COMMENCEMENT (July 22, 2010) (analyzing the U.K. Anti-Bribery Act’s jurisdiction).
229. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.); Marcus Sohlberg, The United Kingdom Bribery Act
2010–Anti-Corruption Legislation with a Significant Jurisdictional Reach, THE L. LIBR. CONGRESS
(Mar. 2011), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-bribery-act.php.
230. Bribery Act, 2010 c. 23, § 1 (U.K.).
231. Id. §§ 2, 3(2).
232. Id. § 6.
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4) failing as a commercial organization to prevent bribery.233 The section
most similar to the FCPA’s “foreign official”234 provision defines a
“foreign public official” as including:
An individual who—(a) holds a legislative, administrative or
judicial position of any kind . . . (b) exercises a public
function— (i) for or on behalf of a country or territory outside
the United Kingdom . . . or (ii) for any public agency or public
enterprise of that country or territory . . . or (c) is an official or
agent of a public international organization [sic].235
Subsection (b) on individuals who exercise a public function for any
public agency or public enterprise is analogous to the FCPA’s
“instrumentality” language and concept.236
On March 30, 2011, the U.K. Ministry of Justice clarified how the
U.K. Bribery Act will operate.237 The policy behind the foreign public
official offense is “the need to prohibit the influencing of decision
making in the context of publicly funded business opportunities.”238
However, the expressed policy offers little clarification as to what types
of SOEs could be covered because it fails to define “public function.”239
The U.K. Bribery Act’s “foreign official” provision closely mirrors the
FCPA definition.240 However, this dilemma may not have been a major
concern for the U.K. Bribery Act’s drafters because the U.K. legislation,
unlike the FCPA, also explicitly criminalizes commercial bribery.241
Case law emanating from the year-old U.K. Bribery Act remains in its
infancy, and thus has not yet produced any clarifications that might
assist U.S. courts.242

233. Id. § 7; see also F. Joseph Warin, et al., The British are Coming!: Britain Changes its Law
on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 8
(2010).
234. See Warin et al., supra note 233, at 8 (describing the foreign public official offense as
“directly analogous” to the FCPA).
235. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6(5) (U.K.).
236. See id.; TARUN, supra note 199, at 430.
237. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE (SECTION 9 OF THE BRIBERY
ACT 2010) 2 (2011).
238. Id. at 11.
239. Id.; see also Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6(5)(b)(i) (U.K.).
240. See Warin et al., supra note 233, at 18.
241. Warin et al., supra note 233, at 18–19.
242. See The U.K. Bribery Act: One Year Later, Enforcement and Its Implications for Companies,
ALIXPARTNERS LLP, 2 (2012) (noting “[t]o date, not a single successful prosecution has been
brought against a company by the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO), which is responsible for
enforcing the law”); Sohlberg, supra note 229.
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U.S. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE CORPORATE CONCEPT
OF CONTROL TO THE FCPA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE
NEEDED CLARITY TO U.S. BUSINESSES

Theories of statutory construction, the legislative history relevant to
the definition of a “foreign official,” and recent court opinions have all
failed to clearly identify the types of entities included within
“instrumentality.” The defendants in FCPA cases argue that neither the
principles of statutory interpretation nor the legislative history fully
clarifies whether an “instrumentality” includes an SOE.243 Because of
the ambiguity in the text and legislative history, courts use an evolving
list of factors relating to the functions performed by the SOE and its
connections to the government.244 These multifactor tests, however,
overcomplicate the issue. Both sides of the debate have agreed that the
statute intends to prevent the detrimental effects of bribery on foreign
governments.245 Therefore, determining the connection the entity has to
the government would inform the extent to which bribery of officials
within that entity would affect the government.
This Comment proposes using the concept of “control” derived from
U.S. corporate law to determine whether an SOE is within the definition
of an instrumentality. The test for “control” is used within corporate law
to determine whether certain shareholders exert sufficient influence that
they have additional fiduciary duties to the organization and non-

243. Both sides of the debate have argued that the legislative history supports their interpretation.
Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 3, United
States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011). The
defendants typically support their narrow reading of the “foreign official” provision with four
principal observations drawn from the legislative history. First, the legislative history contains no
explicit reference to the inclusion of an SOE in the definition. Second, Congress enacted the FCPA
to prevent the “severe foreign policy problems” stemming from bribes to high-ranking government
officials. Third, Congress declined the opportunity explicitly include SOEs in the definition when it
amended the FCPA to conform to the OECD Convention. Fourth, Congress considered including
SOEs in earlier versions of the FCPA, but ultimately omitted them from the version that was
enacted. Defendants in FCPA enforcement actions have claimed that Congress’s decision to discard
the versions that specifically referenced SOEs evinces an intention to not include SOEs within the
definition of a “foreign official.” See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 21–
29. The government contends that a prominent weakness in this argument is that the bill ultimately
enacted did not specifically reject the components of the enumerated list that other bills contained.
Here, Congress adopted a general term that could theoretically include SOEs but, in doing so, did
not mention eliminating SOEs from the definition. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 37–38.
244. See, e.g., supra notes 136–158 and accompanying text.
245. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 22; Gov’t’s Opposition to
Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 1.

14 - Feld Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/13/2013 7:01 PM

276

[Vol. 88:245

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

controlling shareholders.246 To determine whether a shareholder owes
these duties, U.S. courts have developed numerous methods for
ascertaining actual control.247 Adopting these tests in the context of the
FCPA would be beneficial because corporations subject to the FCPA are
already familiar with this concept. A significant body of case law
already exists to clarify the various situations in advance. The use of this
test would help eliminate the inevitable complications that arise as courts
develop a new framework for assessing the connections between SOEs
and governments.
A.

The Principles of “Control” in U.S. Corporate Law Consist of a
Defined Body of Law that Measures Corporate Responsibility

U.S. corporate law has long used principles of “control” to assess
fiduciary duties,248 ownership, or liability for wrongdoing.249 U.S.
corporate law does not provide a bright-line rule for determining the
level of control held over a corporation, but the guidelines courts use are
ones that businesses are accustomed to applying.250 The most dominant
source of U.S. Corporate law is Delaware, where over half of the
corporations listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange are
incorporated.251 Delaware law measures control in two different ways:
(1) percent of ownership252 and (2) actual control.253 When a shareholder
246. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1987).
247. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 72 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that voting rights,
majority—or effective majority—ownership, and participation in management activities all signify
“control” in the corporate sense).
248. For example, courts have used principles of “control” to determine fiduciary duties owed by
controlling shareholders. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114.
249. See, e.g., Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assoc. v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d
1075, 1086 (Ohio 2008) (discussing the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and noting that
control of the corporation is so complete as to amount to total domination of finances, policy, and
business practices such that the controlled corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence); see
also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 247, at 72–75, 90.
250. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 247, at 267 (“Any bright-line rule inevitably will be set
arbitrarily and therefore prove simultaneously over-and under-inclusive.”).
251. See id. (noting Delaware is “far and away the dominant source of state corporation law”).
252. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). But see Odyssey
Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 407–08 (Del. 1999) (holding that an owner of 50.1%
of the stock did not dominate or control the board.)
253. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1344 (“Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary
duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the
corporation.”) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)); see also
In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d. 319, 328 (Del. 1993).
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or group of shareholders has the ability to control the corporate decisionmaking, despite owning less than fifty percent of the outstanding voting
shares, the shareholder is deemed to have (actual) control.254 For
example, in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems Inc., the court
determined that Alcatel was a controlling shareholder even though it
owned only 43.3% of the outstanding stock.255 The court noted a
“shareholder who owns less than fifty percent of a corporation’s
outstanding stocks does not, without more, become a controlling
shareholder of that corporation.”256 However, in relation to Alcatel, the
court determined it exercised control by designating five of its eleven
directors and coercing Lynch to permit it to purchase a sufficient
quantity of stock to become the controlling shareholder, at much lower
than the negotiated price.257
Under Delaware law, the significance of deeming a shareholder
controlling is that it owes fiduciary duties to the corporation and to noncontrolling shareholders.258 Courts evaluate transactions involving
controlling shareholders for “entire fairness,” 259 which is a processoriented standard examining whether the transaction involved “fair
dealing” and a “fair price.”260 This commonly used test for determining
the level of control exerted over the corporation should be transferred to
standardize the approach in determining whether an SOE is an
instrumentality.

254. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994) (noting that “[f]or
a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must
allege domination by a minority shareholder through actual control of corporation conduct”) (citing
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)).
255. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114.
256. Id. (citing Citron, 569 A.2d at 70).
257. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1112, 1120 (“[T]he coercion was extant and directed to a specific
price offer which was, in effect, presented in the form of a ‘take it or leave it’ ultimatum by a
controlling shareholder with the capability of following through on its threat of a hostile takeover.”).
258. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113–14; Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061 n.83 (Del.
2004).
259. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115–17.
260. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“The concept of fairness has
two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces questions of when the
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness
relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the
intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock.”).
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Courts Should Adopt the “Control” Test to Standardize the
Approach to Determining if an SOE Is an “Instrumentality”

Applying the principles of corporate law to determine control would
be advantageous to courts and businesses because of the familiarity of
the applicable tests. Even if the courts decline to adopt a bright-line rule
for determining control based on percentage of ownership, corporate law
has developed numerous methods for ascertaining actual control.261 This
approach to assessing control of an organization, besides being familiar
to both corporations and courts, is also consistent with the method the
OECD uses to define “public enterprise.”262 This continuity would
further clarify an area of law whose imprecise and divergent legal
standards have produced the current confused state of the law—a
confusion that might have an adverse effect on U.S. businesses.
A judicial opinion would likely be the most efficient route to further
clarity for businesses. Alternatives to guidance from the courts would be
the DOJ’s adoption of prosecutorial guidelines or amendment of the
FCPA. Unlike the DOJ advisory opinions, a court’s opinion would
provide precedential value. Even at the district court level, while not
binding, opinions are still persuasive to other courts. The DOJ posits that
the statute is clear; therefore, it seems unlikely to take the initiative to
add further guidance.263A legislative amendment would likely take years
to draft, debate and pass.
Lacking a clear rubric for determining what falls within the definition
of a “foreign official,” well-intentioned businesses are hesitant to engage
in business abroad when they do not know how to structure their FCPA
compliance programs.264 Clear guidelines will provide a framework for
businesses developing their compliance programs and allow those that
wish to adhere to the FCPA to do so. The current enforcement practices,
while lucrative for the DOJ and SEC, seem to have strayed from the
primary rationale behind the enactment of the FCPA.265 This Comment
261. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 247, at 72 (noting that voting rights, majority (or effective
majority) ownership, and participation in management activities all signify “control” in the
corporate sense).
262. See supra notes 199–224 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of a “public
enterprise” focuses on the level of control the government holds over an enterprise.).
263. See Huggard & Morrison, supra note 28.
264. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84; see also MICHAEL V.
SEITZINGER, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS: FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (Mar. 3, 1999),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/Crsfcpa.htm.
265. See Bixby, supra note 13, at 92–94; supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text, summarizing
sources explaining that Congress’s rationale was to prevent U.S. businesses from engaging in
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argues that the most effective way to give sufficient notice to businesses
and still permit prosecution of bribery of SOEs would be for courts to
apply corporate law principles of control to determine what types of
bribery are prohibited under the FCPA.
The DOJ has previously acknowledged that the degree of control a
foreign government exercises over an enterprise informs the DOJ’s
determination of whether the entity is an “instrumentality” under the
FCPA.266 Applying corporate law principles for determining whether a
shareholder is a “controlling shareholder” would be useful in gauging
the level of control the government has over an SOE, thus explaining
whether it conforms to the definition of an “instrumentality.” This area
of law is particularly well-developed (as compared to the FCPA), and
further, this is an area that corporations can be expected to understand.
Applying these principles to the FCPA, the courts would consider the
level of control a government has over an SOE to reflect how closely the
two are linked. This, in turn, would help courts determine whether
bribing an official within that entity would result in the deleterious
consequences that the FCPA was enacted to prevent.
CONCLUSION
The increase in FCPA enforcement actions and the severity of
sanctions has forced companies to reconsider their approach to business
abroad.267 Businesses have resorted to cautious behavior to minimize
their risk of prosecution for violating the FCPA.268 Prosecution can
result in expensive litigation, reputational harm, or high settlement fees.
bribery, as this led to serious foreign policy problems and damaged the image of the United States
abroad.
266. U.S. RESPONSE TO OECD PHASE 1 QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 36.
267. See Witten et al., supra note 11, at 3.
268. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION: COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS – SHOULD ANYTHING BE
DONE TO MINIMIZE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S.’S UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATTING OFFSHORE
CORRUPTION? 7, 11 (Dec. 2011) (noting that the FCPA’s unclear scope and broad interpretation of
the provisions advocated by the DOJ and SEC “may render corporations and individual officers
overly cautious, avoiding not only objectionable conduct but also acts that should be permitted and
even encouraged”); Dickstein Shapiro LLP Alert by David M. Nadler et al., DOJ and SEC Issue
Foreign
Corrupt
Practice
Guidance
(Nov.
16,
2012),
available
at
http://www.dicksteinshapiro.com/resources/alerts/detail.aspx?publication=2233
(“[T]he
longawaited FCPA guidance is a comprehensive and useful restatement of the government’s positions
with respect to the statute, but fails to provide the type of ‘bright line’ rules regarding FCPA
compliance that many practitioners and commentators had hoped for . . . . Companies doing
business in foreign countries must continue to exercise caution, and to obtain expert professional
advice, to minimize their risk of liability under the FCPA.”).
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At the same time, the conservative approach adopted by American
businesses has put them at a disadvantage compared to other
corporations not constrained by the FCPA.
The courts should resolve these issues by refining the definition of
“instrumentality” using principles of corporate law regarding “control.”
This direction remains the most viable option given the limited direction
from the courts thus far in defining “instrumentality.” The FCPA,
though not new, does not have a well-established line of precedent that
answers the question. Strict reliance on the legislative history to
understand the meaning of “instrumentality” has been inconclusive.269
Reasonable arguments support both sides of the debate as to whether the
“foreign official” provision incorporates SOEs.270 An amendment to the
FCPA that clearly defines “foreign official” would be ideal, but is
unlikely to occur any time soon.
Applying corporate law principles of control would help determine
the extent to which the person or entity was a part of the foreign
country’s government. If the courts provided such guidance, businesses
could determine whether an SOE falls under the definition of an
“instrumentality” based on how much control the government retains.
This would provide a clear means of identifying the SOEs whose
employees could influence the government and therefore impact the
public interest if bribed. This approach would achieve Congress’s
objectives in enacting the FCPA to prevent corruption of foreign public
officials and the negative consequences for foreign policy.271 Until such
guidance is formulated, businesses developing their compliance
programs must resort to overly cautious behavior or risk prosecution for
violating the FCPA.

269. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
270. See United States v. O’Shea, No. H-09-629 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011); Aguilar, 783 F. Supp.
2d 1108.
271. See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text.

